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I. INTRODUCTION 
The four amicus briefs address the same two basic issues:   
 Did the actions taken by the State’s 2016 legislature 
constitute compliance with the court orders in this case?  
 If “no”, what (if anything) should this Court do to compel 
compliance?   
Instead of filing four separate Answers, plaintiffs file this one consolidated 
Answer to (hopefully) reduce redundancy and repetition. 
II. ANSWER TO AMICI’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT 
THE STATE’S 2016 COMPLIANCE  
A. The “Progress” Enacted By The State’s 2016 Legislature. 
Back in 2012, this Court unequivocally held that “Article IX, 
section 1 confers on children in Washington a positive constitutional right 
to an amply funded education”,1 and ordered that the 2017-2018 school 
year is a “firm deadline for full constitutional compliance.”2  
                                                 
1 McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 483, 269 P.3d 227 (2012). 
2 December 2012 Order at p.2 (underline added).  The “2018” deadline being the 
2017-2018 school year has already been covered by prior briefing in this case.  
Plaintiffs’ November 2015 Motion For A Timely 2016 Briefing Schedule at p.1 & n.2; 
Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.13.  The on-the-ground impracticality of 
implementing basic education components mid-year over the December 2017 holiday 
break is also a common sense reason why “by 2018” must mean by the 2017-2018 school 
year (starting in the Fall of 2017) instead of by the 2018 calendar year (starting on 
January 1, 2018). 
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Several amici note that the State’s 2016 legislature did not make 
any meaningful ample funding progress beyond what the 2015 legislature 
had already done.3 
They’re right.    
The chart attached as Appendix A to Plaintiffs’ 
July 2015 Post-Budget Filing illustrated the $18.2 billion K-12 budget 
enacted by the State’s 2015 legislature.  After this Court’s August 2015 
Sanctions Order, the State’s 2016 legislature did some minor tinkering at 
the margin – e.g., adding $34 million to help school districts build 
classrooms needed to implement the K-3 component of the State’s basic 
education program, while subtracting $17 million from districts that lack 
the independent wealth to build those classrooms on their own.4  But it did 
nothing to make meaningful funding progress – leaving Appendix A of 
Plaintiffs’ July 2015 Post-Budget Filing essentially unchanged.   
                                                 
3 Corrected Superintendent Of Public Instruction’s Amicus Brief Addressing 2016 
Legislature’s Compliance With McCleary (“Superintendent’s Brief”) at pp.2-3; Brief Of 
Amicus Curiae Washington’s Paramount Duty (“Paramount Duty’s Brief”) at pp.4-9; 
see also Amicus Curiae Memorandum Of The ARC Of Washington State, et al. (“ARC 
Brief”) at p.3 & p.17 (the 2016 legislature reduced special education funding); Amici 
Curiae Brief Of Columbia Legal Services, et al. (“CLS Brief”) at p.17 (“funding for 
Washington’s public schools still remains inadequate and inequitable”). 
4 See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.20-21 & nn.39 & 41. 
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Amici are correct: the State’s 2016 tinkering after the August 2015 
Sanctions Order was not the annual progress mandated by the court 
orders in this case.  
B. The “Plan” Enacted By The State’s 2016 Legislature. 
The State has for years been assuring this Court that it will be fully 
complying with the ample funding mandate of Article IX, section 1 by the 
2017-2018 school year.  This Court has for years therefore been ordering 
the State to produce its complete year-by-year plan for phasing in that 
ample funding for each component of the State’s basic education program, 
as well as demonstrate how the State’s budget each year meets that year-
by-year phase-in plan.5 
Several amici note the State’s 2016 legislature adjourned without 
producing that ample funding plan to phase in full constitutional 
compliance by the 2017-2018 school year.6 
They’re right.   
                                                 
5 See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.27-29 (citing December 2012 Order; 
January 2014 Order; June 2014 Show Cause Order; September 2014 Contempt Order; 
August 2015 Sanctions Order). 
6 Superintendent’s Brief at p.3; Paramount Duty’s Brief at pp.4-9; ARC Brief at p.16 
(E2SSB 6195 does not even hint that the State will fix its special education funding 
formula so that special education funding matches actual costs) and at p.18 (Court 
should “withhold a finding of compliance until the State has demonstrated a plan to fully 
fund basic education, including special education”). 
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The State claims E2SSB 6195 is the court-ordered plan.  That bill 
created another task force to come up with ideas/recommendations for the 
2017 legislature to consider.  That’s not a complete year-by-year plan for 
phasing in the State’s ample funding of each component of its basic 
education program by the 2017-2018 school year.  As the 
Superintendent’s amicus brief aptly states:  E2SSB 6195 is “nothing more 
than a plan to plan” – and after all the State’s prior task forces, studies, 
and reports, the real reason for legislators’ continuing non-compliance 
with the court rulings in this case is not a lack of information, but rather a 
lack of any pressing urgency for them to use that information.7  The 
Paramount Duty amicus brief thus accurately notes that E2SSB 6195 is 
simply “a kick-the-can plan” to delay for another year.8 
Put bluntly, E2SSB 6195 was a way for legislators and the 
Governor to delay serious debate and resolution until after the 
November 2016 election (as well as a way to ensure the legislative session 
adjourned without extended delay, thereby ensuring a timely end to the 
no-fundraising-during-session freeze impacting their November 
re-election campaigns.  See Plaintiffs’ November 2015 Motion For A 
Timely 2016 Briefing Schedule at p.16 & n.32).  
                                                 
7 Superintendent’s Brief at p.3. 
8 Paramount Duty’s Brief at p.4. 
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The charts attached as Appendices D though L of Plaintiffs’ 
July 2015 Post-Budget Filing illustrated the 2015 legislature’s de facto 
“plan” for amply funding the various components of the State’s basic 
education program – i.e., wait until the last minute to come up with a plan 
in 2017.   
In response to this Court’s August 2015 Sanctions Order, the 
State’s 2016 legislature created a task force to come up with ideas at the 
last minute for hopefully coming up with a plan in 2017.  In other words, 
the State’s 2016 legislature simply changed Appendices D though L of 
Plaintiffs’ July 2015 Post-Budget Filing from illustrating the State’s 
de facto “plan” to now be illustrating the State’s actual “plan”.  Changing 
the name of the State’s wait-until-the-last-minute “plan” from de facto to 
actual, however, was not compliance with the court orders in this case.   
Amici are correct: creating a task force to come up with potential 
ideas at the last minute is not a complete year-by-year plan for phasing in 
the State’s ample funding of each component of its basic education 
program as mandated by the court orders in this case.  A punt is not a plan. 
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C. Compliance Conclusion. 
Amici are correct:  the actions taken by the State’s 2016 legislature 
did not constitute compliance with the court orders in this case.  The State 
still has not purged its September 2014 contempt. 
III. ANSWER TO AMICI’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT 
COMPELLING THE STATE’S COMPLIANCE   
A. Whether Government Officials Should Be Compelled To Obey 
Constitutional Rights And Court Orders. 
Amici maintain that constitutional rights and court orders should 
be enforced.9  They’re right.  Lawmakers are not above the law.  
Constitutional rights and court orders are not simply suggestions for 
lawmakers to consider when it fits their political self-interest.  And as the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction points out, failing to now firmly 
enforce the rulings in this case would “reduce the court to the level of 
beggar.”10  The Paramount Duty amicus similarly discusses in detail why 
this Court not only has the power, but the duty, to ensure that Washington 
children’s positive constitutional right to an amply funded K-12 education 
is not violated by the action or inaction of another branch.11 
                                                 
9 Superintendent’s Brief at p.18; Paramount Duty’s Brief at pp.10-20.  
10 Superintendent’s Brief at p.6 (citing case law). 
11 Paramount Duty’s Brief at pp.10-20 (citing case law).  Accord, Plaintiffs’ 
2013 Post-Budget Filing at pp.39-48; Plaintiffs’ 2014 Post-Budget Filing at pp.38-42; 
Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To The Amicus Brief Of Mr. Eugster at pp.3-8; Plaintiffs’ 
August 2014 Answer To Defendant’s Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With 
Errata at pp.9-16. 
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Since plaintiffs agree that this Court should firmly enforce the 
constitutional rights and court orders at issue in this case, the following 
pages address amici’s submissions on how this Court can effectively 
compel compliance. 
B. How Compliance Can Be Compelled. 
The State has for years acknowledged in this case that the purpose 
of a contempt sanction is to coerce a defendant’s decision-makers to 
choose to comply with a court order by making compliance a better choice 
for those decision-makers than continued non-compliance.12  To be 
effective, this Court must therefore make compliance with its prior orders 
regarding Article IX, section 1’s ample funding mandate a more desirable 
option for State decision-makers to choose than continued 
non-compliance.   
This Court’s June 2014 Show Cause Order listed seven potential 
approaches: 
                                                 
12 See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.45-48. 
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1. Imposing monetary or other contempt sanctions; 
2. Prohibiting expenditures on certain other matters until the 
Court’s constitutional ruling is complied with; 
3. Ordering the legislature to pass legislation to fund specific 
amounts or remedies; 
4. Ordering the sale of State property to fund constitutional 
compliance; 
5. Invalidating education funding cuts to the budget; 
6. Prohibiting any funding of an unconstitutional education 
system; and 
7. Any other appropriate relief. 
June 2014 Show Cause Order at p.4.   
Since the amici’s submissions fall under several of those seven 
approaches, plaintiffs organize the rest of this brief under those seven 
headings in order to maintain continuity in these ongoing proceedings. 
1. Monetary Or Other Contempt Sanctions.  
(first option listed in the June 2014 Show Cause Order; see also 
prior briefing on this option13)   
As the Superintendent’s Brief points out, subjecting a defendant 
held in contempt to a fine or imprisonment is usually effective in coercing 
compliance.14  For example, when a parent fails to obey a court order 
                                                 
13 E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at p.45 & nn.134-135; Plaintiffs’ 
2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.47; Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To Defendant’s 
Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at pp.29-31. 
14 Superintendent’s Brief at p.4. 
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requiring the payment of child support, one type of contempt sanction to 
compel compliance is a fine or jail.   
It therefore was not unusual for this Court to impose a large 
monetary fine to try to compel Washington legislators to obey the court 
orders in this case regarding the State of Washington’s paramount 
constitutional duty to amply fund Washington children’s K-12 education.  
But as amici point out, the currently accruing monetary sanction in the 
liquidated sum of $100,000/day, payable daily, has not compelled 
compliance.15  (Indeed, the State’s 2016 legislature chose to simply ignore 
this Court’s monetary sanction and not fund its payment.) 
With respect to the Superintendent’s suggestion that individual 
legislators now be held personally accountable with monetary sanctions 
assessed against them personally,16 plaintiffs do not disagree that such a 
sanction is permissible.  But they are concerned that, at least at this point, 
such a sanction may divert too much energy and attention away from the 
ample funding task at hand by spawning satellite disputes and arguments 
about specific individuals “worthy” and “not worthy” of sanction.   
Plaintiffs therefore continue to believe that the most effective 
options to compel legislators as a group to comply are the school statute 
                                                 
15 Superintendent’s Brief at p.4. 
16 Superintendent’s Brief at pp.6-9. 
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and tax exemption statute options discussed in plaintiffs’ prior filings (as 
well as in Parts 6 & 7(a) below).   
2. Prohibit Expenditures On Certain Other Matters Until The 
Court’s Constitutional Ruling Is Complied With. 
(second option listed in the June 2014 Show Cause Order; see also 
prior briefing on this option17)   
The CLS amici point out that “education is the primary vehicle for 
lifting children out of poverty” and that “education is a critical pathway 
out of poverty.”18  They argue, however, that this “prohibit expenditures” 
sanction should not be imposed in a way that harms funding for the social 
service programs discussed in their brief.19   
But there are many types of expenditures other than those social 
service programs that could be enjoined if this Court imposes this type of 
sanction – e.g., enjoin expenditures on the pay raise legislators gave 
themselves and the transportation package they passed (both of which fall 
below the paramount rank of amply funding the State’s K-12 schools 
first).20   
                                                 
17 E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at pp.45-46 & n.136; Plaintiffs’ 
2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.47; Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To The Amicus Brief Of 
CLS, et al., at pp.1-4; Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To Defendant’s Response To The 
Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at pp.31-33. 
18 CLS Brief at p.8 & p.9. 
19 CLS Brief at p.1. 
20 The Superintendent suggests an across-the-board version of this sanction by 
enjoining funding beyond the partial shut-down plan drawn up in 2015.  Superintendent’s 
Brief at pp.15-16.  But plaintiffs are concerned that that may invite unneeded and 
distracting complications in parsing out which specific expenditures and specific 
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While targeted injunctions against specific expenditures could 
have been an effective intermediate option years ago, plaintiffs believe it 
is now too late to take an intermediate approach.  The 2017-2018 school 
year is now only one regular session away (the 2017 regular session).  
Plaintiffs therefore continue to believe the most effective options to 
compel the significant revenue and funding actions needed to comply in 
that 2017 regular session are the school statute and tax exemption statute 
options discussed in plaintiffs’ prior filings (as well as in Parts 6 & 7(a) 
below).   
3. Order The Legislature To Pass Legislation To Fund Specific 
Amounts Or Remedies.   
(third option listed in the June 2014 Show Cause Order; see also 
prior briefing on this option21)   
This Court’s August 2015 Sanctions Order warned that firmer 
sanctions – “including directing the means the State must use to come into 
compliance with the court’s order” – could be imposed if State decision-
makers chose to continue the State’s ongoing violation of the court orders 
in this case.22 
                                                 
 
expenditure amounts will and will not be enjoined.  (It also may implicate the concerns 
expressed by the CLS amici.) 
21 E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at p.46 & n.137; Plaintiffs’ 
2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.47; Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To Defendant’s 
Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at pp.33-38. 
22 See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.46-47 & n.93 (quoting August 2015 
Sanctions Order at pp.8-9). 
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The ARC amicus brief suggests an order akin to this, specifically 
targeted at amply funding the actual cost of the special education 
component of the State’s basic education program.23  Other possible 
options could be specifically targeting the over $2.9 billion/year 
compensation amount or $2 billion K-3 classroom construction amount 
determined by prior State studies and reports.   
While such targeted sanctions may have been an effective 
intermediate option years ago, plaintiffs believe it is too late to take an 
intermediate approach since the 2017-2018 school year is now just one 
regular session away (the 2017 regular session).  Plaintiffs therefore 
continue to believe the most effective options to compel the significant 
revenue and funding actions needed to comply in that 2017 regular session 
are the school statute and tax exemption statute options discussed in 
plaintiffs’ prior filings (as well as in Parts 6 & 7(a) below).   
                                                 
23 ARC Brief at p.16 (arguing the State should be required to “fix the funding formula 
in order to ensure that special education funding matches the actual costs of meeting 
individual needs. Neither [E2SSB] 6195 nor the 2016 supplemental budget promises – 
nor even hints – that will happen.”). 
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4. Order The Sale Of State Property To Fund Constitutional 
Compliance. 
(fourth option listed in the June 2014 Show Cause Order; see also 
prior briefing on this option24)   
Since none of the amici suggest a sanction along these lines, 
plaintiffs do not address it in this Answer. 
5. Invalidate Education Funding Cuts To The Budget. 
(fifth option listed in the June 2014 Show Cause Order; see also 
prior briefing on this option25)   
Since none of the amici suggest a sanction along these lines, 
plaintiffs do not address it in this Answer. 
6. Prohibit Any Funding Of An Unconstitutional Education 
System.  
(sixth option listed in the June 2014 Show Cause Order; see also 
prior briefing on this option26)   
Last year, the Superintendent’s amicus brief opposed this option.  
But then the State’s 2016 legislature chose to continue the State’s 
non-compliance.  So this year, the Superintendent supports this option as 
being one type of sanction that is now necessary as we approach the 
                                                 
24 E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at p.46 & n.139; Plaintiffs’ 
2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.47; Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To Defendant’s 
Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at pp.39-41. 
25 E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at p.46 & n.140; Plaintiffs’ 
2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.47; Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To Defendant’s 
Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at pp.41-43. 
26 E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at pp.46-47 & n.141; Plaintiffs’ 
2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.47; Plaintiffs’ August 2014 Answer To Defendant’s 
Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at pp.43-47. 
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State’s last legislative session before the looming 2017-2018 school year 
deadline.27 
Plaintiffs agree that one of the two approaches most likely to be 
effective in compelling full compliance is an Order that gives the State’s 
2017 regular session two options: 
(a) choose to fully comply with the court orders and declaratory 
judgments issued in this case, or 
(b) choose to have the State’s unconstitutionally funded school statutes 
struck down as unconstitutional, effective the first day of the 
2017-2018 school year. 
Either way, it’s the 2017 regular session’s choice.28  And as the 
2016 session’s charter schools legislation confirms, legislators take 
prompt, concrete action when this Court invalidates unconstitutionally 
funded school statutes.  
7. Any Other Appropriate Relief. 
(seventh option listed in the June 2014 Show Cause Order; see 
also prior briefing on this option29)   
(a) Suspend All Tax Exemption Statutes Passed By The 
Legislature. 
The Paramount Duty amicus brief argues the appropriate relief in 
this case is to suspend the over 600 State tax exemptions passed by the 
                                                 
27 Superintendent’s Brief at pp.16-18. 
28 See generally Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.47-48. 
29 E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2015 Post-Budget Filing at pp.47-50. 
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legislature if the upcoming regular session of the State’s 2017 legislature 
does not achieve full compliance with the ample funding mandate of 
Article IX, section 1.30   
That approach is consistent with plaintiffs’ prior briefing.31  And 
plaintiffs agree that one of the two approaches most likely to be effective 
in compelling full compliance is an Order that gives the State’s 2017 
regular session two options: 
(a) choose to fully comply with the court orders and declaratory 
judgments issued in this case, or 
(b) choose to have all tax exemption statutes enacted by the legislature 
(before amply funding K-12 schools) struck down as 
unconstitutional, effective the first day of the 2017-2018 school 
year. 
Either way, it’s the 2017 regular session’s choice.32  And as prior 
legislative sessions have shown, the Governor and legislators take prompt, 
concrete action when tax exemption statutes are involved.  
(Although the Superintendent suggests a version of this sanction 
limited to enactments passed after this Court’s 2012 decision, plaintiffs 
believe that since there is now only one legislative session left before the 
2017-2018 school year deadline, now limiting this sanction’s scope to just 
the past several years renders it too weak to effectively compel full 
                                                 
30 Paramount Duty’s Brief at pp.20-21. 
31 Plaintiffs’ 2015 Post-Budget Filing at pp.47-49 & n.123 & n.131. 
32 See generally Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.48-49. 
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compliance by the State’s 2017 legislature.33  The Paramount Duty amici’s 
approach covering all tax exemptions enacted by the legislature is the 
effective option.34)   
(b) Have Court Do A Levy Swipe. 
The Superintendent suggests that this Court could in essence 
impose the first half of a “levy swipe reform” by taking school districts’ 
local levy money away to make school districts “pressure” legislators to 
let them have the school funding their local voters had approved.35 
Plaintiffs do not believe this approach is effective, fair, or 
appropriate in this case.   
Not effective because it does not apply consistent pressure on State 
legislators: no pressure on those from areas where school districts don’t 
                                                 
33 The Superintendent notes that applying this to tax exemptions enacted after this 
Court’s 2012 decision makes some sense because that decision put legislators “on 
notice” that their paramount duty under the State Constitution they swore to uphold is to 
amply fund the State’s public schools.  Superintendent’s Brief at pp.11-15.  Such a 
limitation may have been appropriate last year before the 2016 session began.  But now 
there is only one legislative session left before the 2017-2018 school year deadline.  
Plaintiffs therefore believe that such a limitation is not currently appropriate for several 
reasons:  (1) Article IX, section 1 put legislators “on notice” of the State’s paramount 
ample funding duty long before 2012; (2) this Court’s 1978 Seattle School District 
decision reiterated that paramount duty “notice” again; (3) the February 2010 Final 
Judgment in this case reiterated that “notice” yet again (and the State did not seek any 
stay of that Final Judgment pending appeal); and (4) most importantly, the purpose of 
this sanction is to coerce compliance by making continued non-compliance as tough on 
legislators as possible – and limiting this sanction to only some (as opposed to all) tax 
exemptions the legislature passed when it was not amply funding the State’s public 
schools does not create that maximum pressure. 
34 Accord, Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.48-49. 
35 Superintendent’s Brief at pp.9-11. 
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have a local levy; relatively little pressure on those from areas where 
school districts have relatively small levies; and nothing more than 
moderate pressure on those from areas where school districts have 
relatively large levies (no more than “moderate” because public school 
parents in any legislative district are a minority of the voters a legislator 
caters to).  The past several years of vocal “pressure” on legislators by 
school districts over their lack of ample funding therefore has not been 
effective in producing compliance thus far – and as a practical matter, 
plaintiffs believe that now taking away districts’ local levy funds makes 
their lack of ample funding worse without making the “pressure” on 
legislators correspondingly greater. 
Not fair because when local voters vote for a local levy, they are 
voting to tax themselves to provide the kids in their school district 
enhancements above the basic education that Article IX, section 1 requires 
the State to amply fund.  Telling those voters that the kids in their district 
are going to be deprived of the enhancements they voted for because folks 
in Olympia can’t do their ample funding job is simply not fair to those 
voters, or to the kids for whom they voted to tax themselves to give a 
better than basic education. 
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Not appropriate because this levy swipe approach isn’t necessary 
given the existence of two other, far more effective options – i.e., the 
school statute and tax exemption statute options discussed in plaintiffs’ 
prior filings (as well as in Parts 6 & 7(a) above).   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Amici are correct:  
 the actions taken by the State’s 2016 legislature did not 
constitute compliance with the court orders in this case, and  
 this Court not only has the ability, but the duty, to compel 
full compliance by the 2017-2018 deadline with a firm 
enforcement order.   
While plaintiffs do not believe some of the intermediate 
approaches suggested by amici would be effective in compelling 
compliance at this time, plaintiffs do agree with those amici who suggest 
the school statute and tax exemption statute options discussed in plaintiffs’ 
prior filings (as well as in Parts 6 & 7(a) above).   
The State’s decision-makers are about to run out the clock.  If 
Washington children’s paramount and positive constitutional right to an 
amply funded education is a right rather than a platitude, and if Supreme 
Court Orders are orders rather than suggestions, this Court must now issue 
a strong and firm enforcement order that leaves the State’s 2017 regular 
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session no reasonable choice other than to fully comply without any more 
excuses, gimmicks, or delays.     
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June, 2016. 
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